This study attempts to isolate the underlying processing resources of visual attention from the 'cognitive supervision'-working memory, decision processes, but especially awareness-that typically accompanies their allocation. To decouple them, we used the motion aftereffect (MAE) as a passive assay of resource allocation. In our main condition, observers were presented with an adapting field, but did not attend to it. Instead their effort was directed to an engrossing auditory two-back memory task. Consequently, observers had no consistent awareness of the adaptor, nor were able to make accurate judgements about its luminance, but nonetheless had MAE's no smaller than those induced when the adaptor was 'fully attended'. Similarly to when object-or feature-based attention spreads unwittingly, attention was allocated automatically to the adaptor, without requiring nor engaging executive control or awareness.
Introduction
At least since William James described attention as ''...the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence...." (James, 1890) ,'attention'-the selective enhancement and prioritization of behaviorally relevant information (Treue, 2003) -and 'awareness'-the real-time, conscious experience of a stimulushave been tightly entwined. Though the two have been distinguished (Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & Lavie, 2008; Hardcastle, 1997; Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 2004; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002) , it can still seem a paradox to speak of attending to something without being aware of it or, vice versa, to have a proximal stimulus enter awareness without attending to it (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; He, Cavanagh, & Intriligator, 1996; Lamme, 2003; Merikle & Joordens, 1997; O'Regan, & Noe, 2001; Posner,1994; Velmans, 1996) . This though leads to a contradiction. If attention and awareness are coupled, this implies visual awareness too must be necessary for the processes for which attention is thought necessary, such as 'object binding' (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) , memory gating (Sperling, 1960) , 'serial' visual search (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989) , and much of object detection (where attention misallocation is thought to induce 'inattentional blindness' (Mack & Rock, 1998) and 'change blindness' (Rensink, O'Reagan, & Clark, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1997) , just to name a few. In short this means without visual awareness we would be effectively blind; yet many regular commuters, lost in thought, arrive home without incident.
A relatively new line of experimental evidence also points to the necessity of better distinguishing attention from awareness. In these attention-spreading effects, performance or responses of neurons is not just affected at explicitly attended locations (Connor, Preddie, Gallant, & Van Essen, 1997) , but also winds up affected elsewhere unwittingly and automatically. For instance, consider 'cross-attribute' attention where, for example, attending to the color of a field of drifting dots induces attention to their motion (Sohn, Papathomas, Blaser, & Vidnyanszky, 2004) , 'featurebased attention spreading', where attention to a feature at one location induces global attention effects to like-features beyond this intended focus, for instance when attention to motion in one location influences the responses of similarly tuned neurons in other locations (Arman, Ciaramitaro, & Boynton, 2006; Melcher, Papathomas, & Vidnyanszky, 2005; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton, 2002; Serences & Boynton, 2007; Treue & Martinez Trujillo, 1999; Treue & Maunsell, 1996) , and 'object-based attention' where attention devoted to one feature of an object triggers attention to all of its concomitant features (Blaser, Pylyshyn, & Holcombe, 2000; Duncan, 1984; O'Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher, 1999 ); all of this shows that there is much more to attention than the thin veneer of what we direct it to do, and what we are aware of it having done.
Our goal here is to divorce visual processing resources from the executive, central bottleneck processes (Pashler & Jhonston, 1998 )-working memory, decision, but especially awareness-that typically accompany their allocation. In this way we can observe how resources are allocated when unsupervised. In practice it is notoriously difficult to tease the two apart (''Please attend solely to the red dots on the left while keeping your awareness just on the green dots on the right"). To measure resource allocation without influencing it, we used the magnitude of the motion aftereffect (MAE) as a passive assay.
Attention and the MAE
In 1911, Wolhgemuth had observers view a moving stimulus in his effort to induce and quantify the duration of the MAE (Wohlgemuth, 1911) , an illusion of movement now thought to reflect an imbalance in the relative responses of direction-selective cortical neurons induced by prolonged viewing of an adapting motion stimulus (Mather, 1980; Sutherland, 1961; Mather and Harris, 1998) . He noted significant MAE's. In a separate condition designed to assess the influence attention on this effect, he had them again view the adapting motion stimulus, but asked them to concentrate on a mental arithmetic task. He noted no change in MAE durations. However, nearly a century later, Chaudhuri (1990) performed a similar study, with very different results. In a condition where observers diverted their attention to an RSVP (Sperling, Budiansky, Spivak, & Johnson, 1971 ) task at fixation he found drastic-on average 50%-reductions in MAE durations relative to when observers passively viewed the adapting field of dots (Fig. 1) .
A large body of subsequent behavioral (Alais & Blake, 1999; Georgiades & Harris, 2000; Lankheet & Verstraten, 1995; Rezec, Krekelberg, & Dobkins, 2004; von Grünau, Bertone, & Pakneshan, 1998) and neurophysiological (Berman & Colby, 2002; Huk, Ress, & Heeger, 2001; Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997; Seiffert, Somers, Dale, & Tootell, 2003) studies have confirmed Chaudhuri's (1990) basic result: attending to an adapting motion stimulus maximizes MAE's, while diverting it minimizes them.
Isolating 'dark attention'
The term 'attention' is imprecise. Some visual processing resources may be willfully directed, as when the observer executes an instruction or implements a top-down allocation strategy, but there are circumstances-the vast majority of circumstances, we would argue-when there is a context-dependent, flexible shuttling of resources between visual stimuli, but that neither requires nor engages executive control or awareness. We refer to this as the shadow economy of 'dark attention'. This is not a proposal of new mechanism of attention per se, but an explicit distinction between cases where resources are willfully allocated, and cases where allocation occurs unsupervised. In our main experiment, we try to divert only the panoply of cognitive and conscious processes away from a visual stimulus, to remove supervision from the underlying processing resources, thereby isolating dark attention.
In our main conditions observers were presented with an adapting field of moving dots while performing two tasks concurrently (Braun & Sagi, 1990; Sperling & Melchner, 1978) . One task required observers to make judgments about the luminance of the adapting field, while the other required observers to monitor a stream of numerals to perform a two-back memory task. Observers were instructed how to distribute their effort between the two tasks (e.g. ''give 90% of your effort to the two-back task, 10% to luminance"). These instructions were designed to induce tradeoffs in awareness through concomitant, measurable tradeoffs in task-relevant cognitive processes, such as working memory.
Importantly, we presented the two-back task in two different modalities. In our main experiment, the two-back task was presented auditorially (a spoken stream of numerals presented over headphones) to eliminate demands on visual processing resources (Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; Treisman & Davies, 1973 ) while maximizing cognitive demands (Brand-D'Abrescia and . In a contrasting experiment designed as a basic replication of Chaudhuri, the two-back task was presented visually (an RSVP stream of numerals presented at fixation), thereby invoking significant, likely zero-sum visual demands. In both experiments, we used the magnitude of the motion aftereffect (MAE) as a passive assay resources allocated to the adapting field.
We found that instructions to weight one task or the other did indeed induce tradeoffs in performance between the two tasks. Critically, this was true for both the visual version and the auditory modalities. Given the previous results on attention and the MAE, it is tempting then to expect then that MAE's would be weaker when observers' effort was diverted from the luminance task to (either of) the two-back tasks. Consistent with this prediction, MAE's did drop considerably when effort was devoted primarily to the visual two-back task at fixation, away from the luminance task on the adapting field. However, in sharp contrast, MAE's were undiminished when effort was directed to the auditory two-back task: In a condition where observers ignored the adapting field and instead devoted themselves to an engrossing alternate task-and as a consequence had no consistent awareness of the adapting field and no ability to make judgments about its luminance-MAE's nonetheless were no smaller than those induced in a condition where the adaptor was fully 'attended'. We take this as evidence that a resource-dark attention-was nonetheless allocated to the adaptor, automatically and unsupervised, supporting normal motion processing and therefore maximal MAE's.
Methods

Observers
Six observers (4 naive and 2 expert) with normal or correctedto-normal vision participated in these experiments. Informed written consent was obtained from all observers. Naive observers were University of Massachusetts Boston undergraduate students, who were paid $8.00/h for their participation. Chaudhuri (1990) . This graph shows MAE duration for five observers under two attentional conditions: a passive condition where observers simply viewed the motion adaptation stimulus (a laterally drifting noise field) and a withdrawn attention condition where observers were asked to perform an RSVP task at fixation during adaptation. In this condition, MAE durations dropped on average 50%. We replicate this main effect, but using a true dual-task paradigm, in Experiment 1.
Apparatus
Stimuli were displayed on a ViewSonic PF790 monitor running at 640 Â 480 and 120 Hz. Presentation and response collection were controlled with VisionShell software running on an Apple Mac G4. Observers sat in a darkened room and viewed the monitor from a distance of 57 cm, with head position stabilized by a chin rest. Depending on condition, some stimuli were presented visually and/or auditorially, through headphones. Observers made responses through keystrokes and/or spoken responses into a microphone positioned under the chin rest.
MAE stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 512 small (2 arc min) dots randomly distributed on a dark background. Dot patterns were presented in an aperture with a diameter of 11 deg, yielding a dot density of 5 dots per sq. deg. During stimulus presentation, observers were instructed to fixate on a small central cross. During adaptation, stimuli drifted laterally with a speed of 3 deg/s and 100% coherence, and a limited lifetime of 317 ms. The field of dots also changed luminance dynamically-in unison, randomly but smoothly-between a dim but supra-threshold 3 cd/m 2 to the monitor's maximum luminance of 164 cd/m 2 (please see Fig. 3 for an example trace; this dynamic luminance was relevant to one of our tasks, described below). Adaptation lasted 60 s for the first trial of a block and 30 s for subsequent trials. When the adaptation period ended, there was a 500 ms blank interval and then the test period began. The test stimulus was similar to the adaptation field, but the dots were now physically static, infinite lifetime and displayed at a fixed mid-range luminance of 84 cd/m 2 . During the presentation of the test stimulus, the observer was likely to experience an MAE. When an observer judged that the MAE had ended and the field had reached a perceptual standstill, she pressed a key to terminate the trial. MAE duration was defined as the elapsed time from the beginning of the test interval to this keypress (Fig. 2) . Duration was used as a measure of MAE magnitude to match the measure used by Wohlgemuth (1911) and Chaudhuri (1990) . (It is worth noting here that we ran pilot experiments to determine if the use of limited-lifetime or infinite-lifetime 'static' dots in our test stimuli affected our pattern of results. As we found no difference, we used static fields; we have noticed that naive observers Fig. 3 . Trace of roving luminance used for plateau detection task. The luminance of the adapting dots varied randomly, but smoothly between 3 and 164 cd/m 2 . When performing the 'plateau detection' task, observers monitored this roving for flat spots -brief periods when the dots stayed at a fixed luminance. There were roughly 7 such plateaus in a typical 30 s trial. Fig. 2 . Example trial. Every trial in both Experiment 1 and 2 consisted of two main phases, adaptation and test. During the adaptation phase, observers fixated centrally and were presented with a drifting field of limited lifetime dots. This field also had dynamically roving luminance, with all dots simultaneously randomly, but smoothly, varying. During this phase, observers were asked to perform two tasks concurrently: a 'plateau' detection task (where observers monitored for brief pauses in the dynamic luminance changes, see Fig. 3 ) and a two-back memory task (where observers monitored a stream of numerals for two-back repeats) that was presented either visually, at fixation, or auditorially, over headphones. At the end of the 30 s adaptation period (the first trial of every block was 60 s), a short blank period appeared for 500 ms, and then the trial entered the test phase. In the test phase, observers were presented with a physically stationary field of infinite lifetime dots. Observers judged when the illusory drift of this field reached perceptual standstill, and then pressed a button to initiate the next trial. The time from the end of the blank field to this button press was taken as the MAE duration and served as our measure of MAE strength, consistent with the measure used by Chaudhuri (1990) and Wohlgemuth (1911). are more comfortable judging when static fields reach perceptual standstill.) 2.4. Primary task: plateau detection (luminance judgments with respect to the adapting field) Plateau detection required observers to monitor the luminance changes in the adapting field. Occasionally, the luminance of the field would stop changing for a brief period, then resume roving; observers had to make speeded detections (through a keypress) of these subtle, periodic plateaus. Plateaus lasted 1.5-2.5 s, and occurred with ISI's of 0.5-3.5 s, yielding about 7-8 plateaus in a 30 s trial (Fig. 3) .
A 'hit' was registered when the observer correctly identified a plateau during its presentation, whereas a response outside of this interval was coded as a 'false alarm'. The failure to respond within this interval was coded as a 'miss' while 'correct rejections' were recorded when observers made no response during the intervals between plateaus. These rates were used to compute percent correct performance. Observers received feedback only when a response was made (the fixation cross turned green for hits and red for false alarms). The frequency and duration of these plateaus had been previously calibrated in pilot experiments to yield a difficult, engrossing task with performance levels on average at 50% correct (corrected for guessing) for naive observers with a few blocks of practice. This task is performed on the adapting field itself and is a dummy task of sorts, designed coax observers into fully 'attending' to the adapting field.
Alternate task: visual or auditory two-back memory
The second task in this dual-task paradigm was two-back memory. This task was performed over a stream of numbers that was presented either visually (in RSVP fashion, at fixation) or auditorially (via spoken numerals over headphones). Apart from presentation modality, task and parameters were identical. The numerals 1-5 were used, and were presented in random order at a rate of about one numeral every 2 s (1850-2150 ms). Every time there was a two-back repeat in the sequence-for instance of the numeral 3 in the sequence ''...2 1 3 3 4 3 5 4..."-observers had to make a speeded response (by speaking the word 'yes'; observers made verbal responses for both the visual and auditory versions of this task). Responses immediately following a repeated numeral, before the onset of the subsequent numeral, were coded as hits; other responses were coded as false alarms. Failure to respond within this interval resulted in a miss, while correct rejections were coded when observers withheld responses in the interval following a non-repeated numeral. These rates were used to calculate percent correct measures of performance.
General procedure
All trials consisted of an adaptation and test phase. During adaptation, observers were presented with the adaptation stimulus and performed the plateau and/or the two-back task. In dual-task conditions, observers could be given one of the following instructions to 'weight' one task more strongly than the other: Give 100% of your effort to the plateau task (single-task control); give 90% effort to plateau detection, 10% to two-back memory; give 50%/50% effort to each task; give 10% effort to plateau, 90% to two-back; give 100% effort to two-back (single-task control). (In the dual-task conditions, it is possible that there could be response interference between the two tasks. To rule this out, we performed a simple control where the plateau task was replaced with a structurally identical, but perceptually trivially easy, task: every time the roving dots entered a plateau, the dots flashed red briefly. Observers were no worse at either task when performed together as when each was performed alone-ruling out response-related interference). Instructions were blocked and observers performed two blocks of 10 trials each. MAE durations were measured in the test phase of each trial, allowing us to measure how the instructed biases between the two tasks would affect this measured MAE. This all amounted to three measurements made for a typical dual-task trial: performance on the plateau task, performance on the two-back task, and MAE duration. Experiments 1 and 2, described below, differed only in whether the two-back task was presented visually or auditorially.
Results
Experiment 1: MAE's induced during plateau detection or visual two-back tasks
This experiment was designed as a minimal replication of Chaudhuri's (1990) finding that withdrawing 'attention' from an adapting stimulus significantly reduces the magnitude of the induced MAE. For expediency, only the two single-task baseline conditions were tested during the adaptation phase of each trial: the plateau detection task alone during adaptation, or the two-back task alone during adaptation. Observers ran three 10 trial blocks of each of these conditions. In a confirmation of Chaudhuri's main result, a naive and expert observer both showed significant reductions in MAE duration when effort was devoted to the visual two-back task at fixation, relative to when effort was devoted to plateau detection on the adapting field itself. Expert observer TS's MAE dropped from 15.74 to 5.47 s, while naive observer AB's MAE dropped from 7.61 to 5.74 s. Both the absolute durations of these MAE's and the proportional reductions are comparable to those found by Chaudhuri (1990) .
Experiment 2: MAE's induced during dual-task: plateau detection and auditory two-back
During the adaptation phase of each trial in this experiment, observers performed both the plateau task and the auditory twoback task concurrently. Instructions were given to observers to manipulate the effort that they devoted to each of the two tasks. This resulted in a total of five conditions, which were presented in different blocks and in random order (each block contained a total of 10 trials, and observers ran two blocks of each condition). These five conditions were: 100% effort to plateau detection (single-task control), 90% effort to plateau detection and 10% effort to auditory two-back, 50/50, 10/90, and 100% auditory two-back (single-task control).
As hoped, there was a significant tradeoff in performance between the two tasks as a function of pre-block instruction: observers did better when giving a task more effort, and showed an inability to do both tasks at the same time without loss (with the exception of observer AB). While of course there are tasks which do not compete for resources (like walking and chewing gum) these two tasks do show significant tradeoffs in performance, as seen in the average and individual attention operating characteristics (AOC's; Sperling & Melchner, 1978) (Fig. 4) . (Unfortunately, our data is not fine-grained enough to allow us to make any strong statements about whether these tradeoffs reflect a sharing of cognitive resources between the two tasks, or a switching of resources. What we can say is that performance on a trial-by-trial basis, almost without exception, did not show the telltale negative correlations between performance on the two tasks that would be expected with resource switching. While the lack of correlation is expected of sharing models, this analysis cannot rule out switch-ing. Resources could have been switched within a trial, and we do not have the event-by-event breakdown for performance on each plateau and numeral to reveal this.)
In this fashion, this experiment fits the setup for classic Chaudhuri (1990) results like those found in our Experiment 1. In sharp contrast however, we found that MAE's were undiminished even as less and less effort was given to the plateau task on the adapting field, and were undiminished even in 100% two-back task conditions, when effort and awareness were completely withdrawn from the adapting field (see Figs. 5 and 6) .
When observers fully weighted the adapting dots (100% plateau task), average MAE across our six observers was 10.10 s, and the MAE in the fully withdrawn condition (100% two-back task) was identical, at 10.26 s.
Adaptation duration control
It is possible that the maximal MAE's we found in Experiment 1 reflect a ceiling effect of sorts. Perhaps ignoring the adapting dots actually does affect motion processing and would reduce the MAE, but this withdrawal from the adaptor to the auditory task was somehow incomplete. If the MAE then were very quick to saturate then any 'leakage' back to the adaptor might be sufficient to generate the maximal MAE's we observed. We ran a control experiment just to be sure. In this control, we simulated leakage by modulating the duration of adapting motion during the 30 s adaptation phase. In one condition, adapting motion periods were variable (ranging from 4000 to 500 ms) and were broken up by a fixed 500 ms ISI periods of either static dots or a blank field (blank intervals provide an even stronger test here, as they allow for more potential for MAE 'storage' over the ISI periods, see Verstraten, Fredericksen, van Wezel, Lankheet, & van de Grind, 1996) . In another condition, adapting motion durations were fixed at 500 ms bursts, with variable ISI's (ranging from 500 to 3000 ms) again either of static dots, or a blank field.
In all cases, maximal MAE's only occur with adapting motion close to the full, unbroken 30 s, all but ruling out explanations based on leakage (Fig. 7) .
General discussion
In this study we attempted to divorce the underling visual processing resources of attention from the cognitive and conscious processes-working memory, decision, but especially awarenessthat typically initiate or result from their allocation. Even when such cognitive supervision is removed-say driving while daydreaming-we argue that there remains a context-dependent, flexible shuttling of processing resources between visual stimuli; a shadow economy of what we term 'dark attention'. For instance in our main experiment, observers ignored an adapting field of moving dots, and instead gave their effort to an engrossing auditory memory task. In spite of this, MAE's were undiminished, showing that visual attention can indeed 'go dark': processing resources were automatically directed to the adapting field, without requiring nor engaging awareness.
'Attention' without awareness
Aspects of the interplay of attention and awareness are contentious (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2003) . It is beyond the scope of the present experiment to settle this issue definitively, but we take our results as strong evidence that processing resources can be distributed independently of awareness. One can readily find other evidence, as in reports of cueing at work in individuals with blindsight (Kentridge et al., 2004) , or the significant tilt aftereffects induced by an adapting patch that has been rendered indiscriminable due to the crowding of flanking patches (He & Cavanagh, 1996; Montaser-Kouhsari & Rajimehr, 2005) . Even in the relatively circumscribed domain of attention and the MAE, there is converging evidence to support this independence. For example, Blaser, Papathomas, and Vidnyanszky (2005) performed a study where they showed that color-contingent MAE's were undiminished even when the adapting motion was invisible (see also Whitney & Bressler, 2007) . In one condition, the adapting stimulus contained a rightward field of red dots and a leftward field of green dots, sliding transparently over one another. In another condition, dots were 'locally paired' such that every rightward red dot was on a collision course with a nearby leftward green dot; in this case the motion 'canceled out' perceptually, and the adaptor appeared as a motionless flicker. MAE's were identical in both cases. This is strong evidence that the underlying processing resources-dark attentionwere allocated without direction, since in the invisible-adaptor condition there was simply no relevant target for executive control or awareness to latch onto (while in the transparent condition, either or both of the clearly visible adapting motion vectors could be engaged).
Competition for dark attention
To what extent dark attention influences, for instance, the MAE depends in part on how much competition there is between the adapting field and other stimuli. Indeed, the magnitude of the MAE in our experiments was manipulated by the nature of an alternate task. In some contexts there is competition, for instance, an RSVP task at fixation (our Experiment 1; Chaudhuri, 1990; Rezec, 2004) , where dark attention targets the RSVP characters at the expense of the adapting field, resulting in reduced aftereffects. Similarly, in a recent study that follows from Lavie's (1995) 'perceptual load' model of attention, Bahrami et al. (2008) found that the extent of adaptation to an oriented patch-which, critically, was masked from awareness-was determined by the perceptual demands of a concurrent visual task. (It is important here to differentiate what we are calling dark attention from various invocations of 'preattentive' or non-attentive visual processes (Braun & Julesz, 1998; Braun & Sagi, 1990; Moray, 1959; Neisser, 1967; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; VanRullen et al., 2004; Wolfe et al., 1989) . Such processes are understood as mandatory, while dark attention is flexible.)
Given this, alternate tasks in non-visual modalities (Duncan et al., 1997; Treisman & Davies, 1973) should not affect the MAE, as they will not compete for visual processing resources. This, of course, explains the disparity in Wolhgemuth's (1911) and Chaudhuri's (1990) results, as well as the difference in results between the present study's Experiment 1, which used a visually presented two-back task, and Experiment 2, which used an auditory twoback task. There is additional converging behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that shows greater modulation of the MAE and related cortical activity when 'attention' is diverted to a visual as opposed to an auditory task (Ciaramitaro & Boynton, 2007 . MAE duration by observer, Experiment 2. This graph shows MAE durations for each of our six observers in single-task control conditions where observers only had to perform one task during a block of trials (error bars reflect standard errors). In the plateau only condition, observers devoted all their effort to the plateau task (which had observers continuously monitoring the roving luminance of the adapting field) and therefore to the adapting field itself. In two-back only conditions, observers were asked to devote all their effort to the auditory two-back memory task. This task competed significantly for cognitive and conscious resources with the plateau task (as results in Fig. 4 show). Even under fully withdrawn conditions, when observers gave full effort to the two-back task and ignored the adaption motion field, MAE's were undiminished. This graph shows that pattern of MAE duration, for each of our six observers, as a function of the attention allocation instruction that they were given for a particular block of trials (i.e. 'give 100% of your attention to the plateau task'; 'give 90% to the plateau task and 10% to the auditory two-back task'; '50/50'; '10/90'; and '100% auditory two-back'). As the graph shows, MAE's were unaffected by these instructions, even though they resulted in dramatic shifts in performance and awareness between the two tasks (see Fig. 4 ).
late cortical activity between the auditory and visual systems (Shomstein & Yantis, 2004) , and there have been results showing that MAE duration (Houghton & Macken, 2003) and cortical activity in visual area MT+ are attenuated by attention to an auditory task (Berman & Colby, 2002) ).
Interestingly, there are cases where prima facie 'competing' demands do not diminish the processing of other stimuli. Featurebased attentional spreading is a good example, where neural responses and adaptation processes can be influenced in regions of the visual field that are not willfully attended (Arman et al., 2006; Melcher et al., 2005; Saenz et al., 2002; Serences & Boynton, 2007; Treue & Martinez Trujillo, 1999; Treue & Maunsell, 1996) . The results of Arman et al. (2006) are especially illustrative here. There observers directed 'attention' to a moving field while MAE's were measured from an secondary adaptation stimulus in an ignored region of the display. This stimulus yielded stronger MAE's when the target of attention was a similarly moving field, as opposed to when it was an oppositely moving one. In what seems at first blush paradoxical, attention could be withdrawn from an adapting stimulus, yet the result was not a reduction in the MAE but an enhancement. (This again highlights the inadequacy of the term 'attention'. One can speak of devoting 'attention' to the target adaptor and withdrawing it from the secondary adaptor, but this use includes the manipulation of resources that are apparently epiphenomenal to the MAE (e.g. awareness) while failing to adequately capture the manipulation of actual processing resources. What really determined whether processing resources were devoted to the secondary adaptor or not was determined by 'context': the motion direction of target adaptor.) This result dovetails nicely with other results, including Chaudhuri's less discussed second experiment (Chaudhuri, 1990) , where 'attention' was withdrawn to a color discrimination task, but where the to-be-judged colors were part of the adapting field itself: MAE's were undiminished. 'Cross-attribute' (Sohn et al., 2004) spreading ensured that what we term dark attention was devoted both to the color and the motion of the moving field.'
Conclusion
The distinction we emphasize here between visual awareness and underlying visual processing resources owes much to earlier attention models (Folk, 1992; Neisser, 1967; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Lavie, 2006; Braun & Julesz, 1998; Pashler, 2001; VanRullen et al., 2004) . Exploiting this distinction helps illuminate the rules of unsupervised resource allocation (what we call 'dark attention'), but also if awareness as well as other cognitive processes can be teased away from, say, a motion stimulus without diminishing its power to yield a MAE, then such an arrangement could provide for cleaner behavioral and neurophysiological studies.
